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Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics, optimal control theory and engineering using dynamic games. Particularly the framework of linear quadratic differential games is often used to analyse problems due to its analytic tractability. In environmental economics, marketing and macroeconomic policy coordination, policy coordination problems are frequently modeled as dynamic games (see, e.g., the books and references in [8] , [21] , [12] , [29] , [26] and [19] ). In optimal control theory the derivation of robust control strategies (in particular the H ∞ control problem) can be approached using the theory of (linear quadratic zero-sum) dynamic games (see the seminal work of [5] ). In the area of military operations, pursuit-evasion problems and, more recently, problems of defending assets can also be approached using linear quadratic modeling techniques (see, e.g., [17] , [24] , [25] ). Furthermore, this modeling paradigm has been used in the area of robot formation and communication networks (see, e.g., [16] , [3] ).
In this note we consider the open-loop linear quadratic differential game. This open-loop Nash strategy is often used as one of the benchmarks to evaluate outcomes of the game. Another benchmark that is often used is the state feedback strategy. Recently, [7] compares both strategies to see what the loss in performance of players may be using either one of these strategies. For the scalar game (see the paper for precise details on the game) they find that if there is a large number of players involved in the game, the ratio of losses for an individual player under a feedback and open-loop information structure ranges between √ 2 2 and √ 2. This indicates, that the difference in performance using either one of the information structures is not dramatic.
The linear quadratic differential game problem with an open-loop information structure has been considered by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and Ho in [30] (see, e.g., [27] , [28] , [9] , [18] , [15] , [2] , [10] , [11] , [6] , [22] and [12] ). In [13] the (regular indefinite) infinite-planning horizon case for affine systems under the assumption that every player is capable to stabilize the system by his own was studied, which result was generalized in [14] where it is just assumed that the system as a whole is stabilizable.
[23], [20] and [4] considered for a finite planning horizon the corresponding differential game problem for an open-loop information structure if the system is corrupted by deterministic noise. They introduced the notion of Nash/worst-case equilibrium to model noncooperative behavior in an uncertain environment. Under some assumptions, concerning in particular the existence of certain Riccati differential equations, they showed the problem has a solution. In this note we will not make these assumptions upfront and reconsider the problem from scratch. Following the standard analysis as presented, e.g., in [12, Chapter 7] we will derive here both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a solution for this problem. In particular we will show that for this problem also situations occur where there exist an infinite number of Nash/worst-case equilibria. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given under which a unique equilibrium occurs.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we show that the problem can be reformulated as a linear quadratic differential game with an additional initial state constraint. This result is then used in section 3 to present existence conditions. Furthermore we present an example where an infinite number of equilibria exist. In the concluding remarks we discuss a number of issues left for future research. Finally, in the appendix we present the proof of the main theorem from section 3.
An equivalence result
In this paper we consider the problem to find Nash equilibria for a linear quadratic differential game that is subject to deterministic noise. With
M i is assumed to be symmetric, R ii and R wi positive definite (> 0), i ∈ N 1 , and x(t) ∈ IR n is the solution of the linear differential equatioṅ
Notice we make no definiteness assumptions w.r.t. matrix Q i .
We assume that in this uncertain environment every player wants to minimize his individual cost function J i by choosing u i appropriately. Since all players interact, it is obvious that without making any further specifications the outcome of the game cannot be predicted as every player will preferably base his action on the 1 N := {1,··· ,N} actions taken by the other players in the game and his expectations concerning the disturbance that will occur. Therefore, depending on the information players have on the game it is to be expected that in the end a set of actions will be chosen from which no individual player has an incentive to deviate. That is, a so-called set of Nash equilibrium actions will be played. We will analyze this problem here under the assumption that the game is played under an open-loop information structure.
From [20] we recall the next definition of Nash/worst-case equilibrium, which we assume will be played by the players. 
holds for each w ∈ W , i ∈ N.
The controls
(u * 1 , · · · , u * N ) ∈ U form a Nash/worst- case equilibrium if for all i ∈ N (a) For all u ∈ U ,
there exists a worst-case disturbance from the point of view of player i and (b)
The above definition reflects the idea that every player wants to secure against a for him worst-case realization of the disturbance. Matrix R wi models his expectation about the disturbance and can be interpreted as a risk aversion parameter. In case he expects that only a small disturbance Dw(.) might disrupt the system, he can express this by choosing R wi large. A Nash/worstcase equilibrium models then a situation where every player has no incentive to change his policy given his worst-case expectations concerning the disturbance and the actions of his opponents. Clearly, in a situation where players can observe the realization of the disturbance and they can adapt their actions during the game other solution concepts like the soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [12, Chapter 9] ) are more appropriate. The next lemma 2.2 shows that Nash/worst-case equilibria can be determined as the OLN equilibria of an associated extended linear quadratic differential game.
In this lemma we use the next notation.Ê Nn will denote the block-column matrix containing N blocks of n × n identity matrices and E i, j the block-column matrix containing i blocks of n × n zero matrices with block number matrix j replaced by the identity matrix. Furthermore, I and 0 (where sometimes we use an index to indicate the size of these matrices) will denote the identity matrix and zero matrix of appropriate size, respectively. diag(A) N will denote the N × N block diagonal matrix with diagonal entries matrix A. Lemma 2.2 u * ∈ U with corresponding worst-case disturbancesŵ i (u * ) is a Nash/worst-case equilibrium for (1, 2) 
if and only if
where player i likes to minimize his cost function
w.r.t. u i , i ∈ N, and player i, i
Proof: ⇒ Assume u * is a Nash/worst-case equilibrium. Then, by definition, (u * i ,ŵ i (u * )) constitutes a saddle-point solution for player i if the other players, j, play u * j . Consequently (see e.g. [12, Theorem 3.26] ),
Some elementary rewriting shows that this is equivalent with the minimization ofJ
subject to the systeṁ
,
Similarly, we have that the maximization of
From (3) again, it follows that this maximum is attained at w i =ŵ i (u * ). So, (u * ,ŵ(u * )) is an OLN equilibrium for the 2N player differential game. ⇐ Let (u * , w * ) be an OLN equilibrium for the 2N player differential game. Then
Now, consider the maximization of J i (u * , w) w.r.t. w subject to the systeṁ
A simple elaboration of (5) shows that this maximum is attained at w = w * i . So,ŵ i (u * ) = w * i . Now, let (u i , u * −i ) be an arbitrary admissible control andŵ(u i , u * −i )) a corresponding worst-case control.
Then, by definition of worst-case control,
From (4) it follows that this lastmentioned minimum exists and is attained at
follows by a direct comparison of both functions.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for
Nash/worst-case equilibria
For presentation purposes we will consider here just the simplified two-player linear-quadratic differential game, where the dynamics of the game is described by the linear differential equatioṅ (6) MTNS 2014 Groningen, The Netherlands with x(0) = x 0 , and both players have a quadratic cost functional J i (u 1 , u 2 , w) given by:
in which all matrices are symmetric, and R ii , R wi are positive definite. Using the shorthand notation
and H + for the Moore-Penrose inverse (see e.g. [1] ) of matrix H the following theorem is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.1 Consider matrix M
Assume that the four Riccati differential equations, (11) is not invertible either the game has for some initial states no equilibrium, or, for every initial state there exists an infinite number of equilibrium actions. 4.26e 1.
Then, the two-player linear quadratic differential game (6,7) has a Nash/worst-case equilibrium for every initial state x 0 if and only if with matrix H(T ) :=
[I 2N 0 2N×4N ]e −MTQ T ,
H(T )H + (T )
I I = I I .(11)
Moreover, if the above condition (11) applies, with v(t) := e M(t−T )Q

The two-player linear quadratic differential game (6,7) has a unique Nash/worst-case equilibrium for every initial state x 0 if and only if matrix H(T ) is invertible. The unique equilibrium actions can be calculated either from the above equations or from the linear two-point boundary value problemẏ(t) = My(t), with
Py(0) + Qy(T ) = [x T 0 x T 0 0 0 0 0] T .(12)T I 0 Q T 0 I   . Denoting [y T 0 (t), v T 1 (t), v T 2 (t), v T 3 (t), v T 4 (t)] T := y(t),
Remark 3.2 In case matrix H(T ) introduced in
the equilibrium/worst-case actions are 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we reconsidered the finite planning horizon open-loop linear quadratic differential game that is disrupted by deterministic noise. We derived both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has an open-loop Nash/worst-case equilibrium. We showed that Nash/worst-case equilibria can be calculated from a "virtual" linear quadratic differential game where with every player a "nature" player is introduced that tries to maximize the performance criterium w.r.t.
to the disturbance. Based on this equivalence result we derived both necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash/worst-case equilibria along the lines these conditions are obtained for the noise-free linear quadratic differential game. The only difficulty arises in an extra condition that is imposed on the initial state of the extended system. In an example we showed that, different from the noise free case, multiple equilibria may occur. As a result of the analysis we could also easily establish both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique equilibrium. Open issues that remain to be settled are how these results can be used to arrive at both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash/worst-case equilibria for an arbitrary planning horizon [0,t f ], where t f ranges between 0 and T . In the noise-free case necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of this problem can be formulated in terms of existence to a set of coupled Riccati differential equations. Unfortunately, due to the initial state restrictions for the extended system, such a generalization for the disturbed game is less obvious. Clearly, by e.g. ignoring this restriction and assuming that the corresponding "noisefree" Riccati differential equations have a solution one easily obtains a set of sufficient conditions for the existence to the problem. However, the question remains how far these conditions are necessary too. Such existence conditions may also help to solve the corresponding infinite planning horizon problem.
Appendix
Proof Theorem 3.1 By Lemma 2.2 the two-player linear quadratic differential game (6-7) has a Nash/worst-case equilibrium for every initial state x 0 if and only if with
, the next four-player game has a Nash equilibrium for every initial state x 0 . 
and
Unfortunately, the initial state of this extended system can not be arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, we cannot use directly existing results on open-loop LQ games to derive both necessary and sufficient existence conditions for a Nash equilibrium. However, we can follow the lines of the proof for the standard case (see, e.g., proof of [12, Theorem 7.1] ) to obtain these conditions. Suppose that (u * i (.), w * i (.)) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, by the maximum principle, the Hamiltonian
is minimized by player i w.r.t. u i , i = 1, 2, and 
with boundary conditions
and Q e := diag(Q i ) the above reasoning shows that, if there is a Nash equilibrium, then for every x 0 the next linear two-point boundary value problem has a solution.
Here It is easily verified that a solution of this set of differential equations is given bym 1 (t) = m 1 (t) and x 1 (t) = x 1 (t). Since its solution is unique this implies that u 1 (t) = u * 1 (t). Or, stated differently,
Similarly it can be shown that the corresponding inequalities for the cost functions for the other players apply. Which shows that (u * 1 , u * 2 , w * 1 , w * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium for the extended game. So, by Lemma 2.2, these strategies yield a Nash/worst-case equilibrium.
Finally, the uniqueness result follows since z 1 is uniquely determined if and only if H(T ) is invertible.
